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英国论文代写范文精选-On the policy of military diplomacy in India

2016-05-24 | 来源:51due教员组 | 类别:更多范文

51Due英国论文代写网精选assignment代写范文:“On the policy of military diplomacy in India”,这篇论文主要讲述了印度与以色列建立全面和正常外交关系的背景,库马拉斯瓦米指出,两个国家的武器结合、武装力量的现代化和武器的出口都是出于国家利益的考虑,而印度在其本土的武器升级和军队现代化的问题是它寻求与以色列军事合作的主要因素。

Israel supplied a limited quantity of arms and ammunitions to India during the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars. According to P. R. Kumaraswamy, 'the decision by Indias Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, in January 1992, to establish full and normal diplomatic relations with Israel was partly influenced by an appreciation of the potential security cooperation between the two countries'. Kumaraswamy further adds that to both the countries arms build-up, modernization of defence forces and arms export were of national interest. The stress would be on first-rate weapons and military independence. India's problems in its indigenous capability to upgrade and modernise its armed forces was a major factor for it to seek military cooperation with Israel.

J. N. Dixit, the former Secretary of Ministry of External Affairs and National Security Advisor of Government of India, was one of the architects of reorienting India's policy on Israel. In his memoirs, My South Block Years, he indicates the fact that "Israel had developed expertise in improving the weapons' systems of Soviet origin, which could be utilized by India"(Dixit 1996) as the major reason behind the Indian policy change. P R Kumaraswamy also referred to this indirectly while stating "the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the multiplicity of suppliers meant that India had to negotiate with numerous countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). The fragmentation of the supply system made India extremely vulnerable". (Kumaraswamy 1998)

Since the mid-1960s the former USSR was the major supplier of most of the Indian weaponry. After collapse of the Soviet Union, the unreliability of future arm supplies, especially spare parts, became a serious concern of the Indian Army. The Indian military establishment now looked eagerly to possible military cooperation with Israel's military industries to further its interest in achieving military technological independence. As a matter of fact, even before the breakup of Soviet Union, India had misgivings with respect to Soviet weapons supplies:

"During the 1991 Gulf war Moscow failed to come to assistance of a third world client, it was prepared to stand on the side lines and watched the Iraqi military machine be destroyed. One of the major attractions of receiving weapons from the Soviet Union had been its reliability as a defense supplier, particularly when war had broken out. National security policy makers in Delhi needed to reassess the implications of Soviet behaviour in the Gulf war towards the other major recipients of Soviet weapons and adjust pattern of sourcing defense supplies accordingly".

The Gulf war had also exhibited superiority of the American weapon systems over the Soviet equipment. Further, the efficacy of India's indigenous arms production was debatable in light of adversary states like Pakistan having access to Western weapons (Thomas 1993). Besides, India had been attempting to diversify its weapon procurement since 1991, and Israel was a ready supplier of specific advanced military equipment and technology which was not freely available from Western countries. (Hewitt 1997).

Counter-Terror Interests
Like Israel, India feared radicalisation of its Muslim minorities. India was concerned as regards radical Islamic fundamentalism at home, which had the potential of encouraging domestic terror, secessionist Muslim movements in Kashmir (the uprising in Kashmir was at its peak in 1990), and terror by proxy initiated by Pakistan. A possible takeover of Pakistan by radical Islam had also to be considered along with its potential implications on India's national security.

The experience of Israel in countering terror was apt and could be of immense military service to India. Strategically, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism post the 1990 Gulf war encouraged parallel movements in South Asia and aggravated Hindu-Muslim tension in India (Thomas 1993). In less than one month after India announced full diplomatic relations with Israel, on 23 Feb 1992, Sharad Pawar, then Defence Minister, stated that normalisation lined the way to drawing on Israel's experience in curbing terrorism. While this statement was denied, three months later Pawar himself, now as the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, on direct instructions from then Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao, led a delegation to an agricultural exhibition in Tel Aviv; the delegation included a high level military team, which made a visit to various military facilities in Israel, including the Israeli Anti Terror Unit. Israel's counter-terror experience has been cited as the main reason for the transformation in Indian policy on Israel, as Stephen P Cohen observes in his book 'India - Emerging Power': "the dangers from Islamic extremism were so great that it was worth risking domestic Muslim opposition".

According to J. N. Dixit, "Israel's knowledge and experience in countering terrorism and dealing with secessionist movements in different parts of the country would be of an immediate relevance to India". Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, the Indian National Security Guards (NSG) was formed. An elite commando unit, the NSG was responsible for VIP protection, anti hijacking and counter terrorism operations. The unit developed some degree of-and unsubstantiated-cooperation with the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), mostly training courses. (Kumarawamy, 1999).

Intelligence interests
Cooperation between Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India's intelligence agency, and Agency for Intelligence and Special Operations (Mossad) its Israeli counterpart, has been long-standing. Harsh V Pant observes that "a close collaboration existed between RAW and Mossad. This collaboration was the result of a secret cooperation agreement in the area of security, intelligence and military equipment". This cooperation began in the second half of 1960s, guided by Meir Amit, then head of the Mossad. Further, this was an ongoing and uninterrupted cooperation, even during the second term of Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister, who had a staunch anti-Israel attitude, or during times of other vacillations in India-Israel bilateral relations until 1992. The establishment of diplomatic relations in that year opened a formal structure and opportunities for closer reciprocity in matters of intelligence.

Foreign affairs interests
India officially recognized Israel through an exchange of notes between the countries' Ambassadors in Washington on 18 September 1950, in keeping with terms of international law and diplomatic practice. Israel, however, did not figure on a high priority for India's foreign policy, as brought out in chapter 3. Financial constraints and scarcity of personnel forced India to postpone setting up new missions or in making missions responsible for neighbouring countries; Israel was one such country affected by these measures. Being geographically separated with no direct conflict or points of territorial or military friction between the two kept foreign affairs interests for both at bay, even though both shared a historical background as ancient civilizations and had several similar characteristics. Both fought for freedom from the British colonial rule and with the struggle eventually leading to formation of independent democratic states, each headed by a 'father of the nation' (David Ben-Gurion and Jawaharlal Nehru). Even the concept of India by Nehru as a secular socialistic parliamentary democracy found similarity in Ben-Gurion's idea of Israel as a secular Jewish social democracy.

Political link between statehood and religion is another similarity between the two countries (although India is constitutionally a secular state and opposes religion as a basis for nationality). In fact, India and Israel were the only democracies in their respective regions.

Preoccupied with the Kashmir dispute, and wanting to do nothing to upset its local Muslim community, India initially promoted its interests with Arab and Islamic states by exploiting the Israeli issue. Political considerations and regional as well as international developments prevented any meaningful diplomatic interaction between the two states.

Geo strategic and political changes post cold war forced India to have a relook on its Israeli policy in 1991. Raja C. Mohan, in his book Crossing the Rubicon points out that "India, driven by necessity, abandoned the philosophical premises that had guided its diplomacy for forty years. The resulting new Indian foreign policy proved more suitable for meeting the challenges of the coming century". Five profound changes in foreign policy of India in the early 1990s, which had a directly influenced the decision of transformation of its policy on Israel as highlighted by Mohan are:-

"A shift in national orientation from domestically focused socialism to capitalism.
Redirection of the economy: liberalization with the emphasis on trade and foreign investment, which replaced the begging bowl as a symbol of Indian diplomacy.

Abandonment of India's forty-year love affair with the Third World, symbolized by its obsession with Non-Alignment and its leadership in that movement. India became more interested in participating in directing the international system, rather than remaining merely a discontented leader of the Third World "trade union". The national self-interest became the driving force behind Indian diplomacy.

Rejection of instinctive anti-Westernism, which for four decades had dominated Indian thinking on the global order.

Replacement of India's idealistic bent by a new hard-headed, bottom line pragmatism". (Mohan 2003).

Israel, for its part, was hopeful that while gaining from diplomatic relations with India, this advancement would persuade other countries in Asia, in general, and Asian Muslim countries in particular, to institute diplomatic ties with it.

Economic interests
By 1991 India's economy was on the brink of collapse. This aspect also had a profound impact on the change in Indian attitude towards Israel with the opportunity for trade, technology transfer and investments from Israel. "Israelis were interested in establishing economic relations with India and were willing to invest here. They also wanted to initiate scientific and technological cooperation with us. Israel's agricultural experiences in dry farming, desert irrigation, agro-industries and agricultural cooperatives could prove beneficial to India". 

Geo-strategic interests
As described by Dixit, India's geo-strategic interest was of much importance in its attitude to Israel:

"The importance to India of the region from the Gulf to Israel and Turkey cannot be ignored Arab sea lanes and air space are of vital economic and strategic interest".

The strategic location of Israel on the Northern or North-Eastern flank of a number of Muslim countries, which promoted Islamic religious fanaticism in Central Asian and South Asian region was of interest to India but at the same time was also a cause of concern as Dixit while referring to some strategic choke points like the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and Bab El Mandeb (the strait at the entrance to the Red Sea) observes "Arab and other Muslim countries in West Asia and Maghrab could pose a geo-strategic threat to Indian security if they adopted hostile attitudes toward India's initiating full fledged political connections with Israel".

Energy and oil
Gulf oil was one of the main factors forcing India to distance itself from Israel as it was heavily dependent on the region for oil. While explaining this aspect, Dixit states that "the Gulf countries and Iran are vital sources of oil and petroleum products for India". Dixit further notes that "the oil factor was an issue particularly scrutinized in the Ministry of External Affairs before it submitted its recommendation for a policy change to Prime Minister Rao as establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel could have an adverse impact on oil supply from the Gulf to India". In the event, declining oil prices post Gulf war played a constructive role in Indian considerations regarding Israel. In the first half of 1990 oil production was high resulting in fall in oil prices to $14 per barrel by June 1990. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in Aug that year and with enforcement of an international embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, the prices jumped to $23 per barrel. With OPEC agreeing to raise the oil production, prices, which reached $40 per barrel in early Oct, fell to $25 per barrel. By the first quarter of 1991 the prices went down to $19 per barrel before falling further to $17.5 in the second quarter and to $16 a year later. The low prices directly encouraged the Indian policy change towards Israel.

Indian Ocean
Historically, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been an area of international competition for geo-strategic, political, military and economic advantage. Both, India and Israel, have a strategic interest in the IOR. India, given its location, had a vital national interest in the region. Israel, early on, developed interest in the IOR as it offered not only the sole maritime route to Asia, but also the only aerial route as Israeli aircraft could not overfly Arab countries in the Middle East. Further, for Israel, the Indian Ocean offers potential strategic naval depth, which it obviously lacked due to its small geographical size, especially after the downgrading of its relations with South Africa.

Nuclear Power Interests
India set up the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) shortly after independence and an extensive program of civilian nuclear research was soon launched, which also had scope for a military project. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which sanctioned the use of nuclear technology for civilian purposes under international supervision of International Atomic Energy Association (IAEC),was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1968. India being conscious of China's nuclear capacity, declined to join the NPT as the treaty had no specified provision for collective security against threat by nuclear states and, the restriction it imposed on the sovereign rights of non-nuclear states to defend their national security. India, instead, adopted a non-weaponised deterrence, called recessed deterrence which Cohen observes as "an undeclared nuclear weapon, whether assembled or not, provided a security umbrella in the unlikely case that another power threatened India with nuclear weapon".

Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in the 1980s was watched closely by India. As described by P. R. Kumaraswamy, "The Indian security establishment was following closely Israeli military successes such as the bombing of the Osiraq Nuclear Reactor near Baghdad in 1981".

In the 1980s, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's proposed action plan of phased global and regional nuclear disarmament failed, Pakistan was clandestinely acquiring nuclear capability between 1987 and 1990, Chinese nuclear threat was also looming over India and both, India and Pakistan, refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India's recessed deterrence was a long-term option, which failed to address the more immediate regional nuclear threat which India faced. While analysing the nuclear power interests of India and Israel in light of the above developments, Itzhak Gerberg notes that "in the early 1990s Pakistan was convinced that India was working on a sophisticated process of inertial confinement fusion in order to produce and develop nuclear weapons, including a hydrogen bomb. Israel was concerned that Pakistan would in return develop a nuclear device of its own, which could later be transferred to extremist Arab countries; therefore, intelligence collaboration between Israel and India could be of a benefit to both". At that time, in 1991, the international media speculated about Indo-Israeli nuclear cooperation, but in fact no such collaboration existed as Israel was suspicious about India's suspected nuclear collaboration with Iran.

However, there still existed space for an indirect complementary cooperation. India and Israel were both non-signatories of the NPT and the CTBT (Israel eventually signed the CTBT in 1996). The two countries perceived missiles and satellites, non-conventional ambitions with regard to nuclear weapons, as a tool for furthering national interests as well as technological independence. India began development of an indigenous missile system in 1983 with start of the Indian integrated missile program, which could be immensely benefited by Israeli know-how and technology. Around the same time, Israel developed keen interest in Indian satellite production, ongoing since 1970.

以上就是印度军事外交上与以色列之间的关系的政策背景及介绍,希望对大家能有所帮助。


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